The AKRITAS PLAN was drawn up
in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot leadership and set out the guidelines towards
achieving ENOSIS (annexation of Cyprus to Greece) through extermination of the
Turkish Cypriot population on the island. A Greek Cypriot newspaper, ''Patris'',
published the details of this plan for genocide in April 1966 until which time
the document had remained a well-kept secret.
Soon after the foundation of
the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, President Makarios had begun setting up an
organisation responsible for achieving the 'final solution' i.e union with
Greece. The organisation was to be led by the Interior Minister, the chief of
EOKA, Policarpos Yorgadjis, whose code name was AKRITAS. The Minister of Labor
Thassos Papadopoulos was appointed deputy chief. The leader of the House of
Representatives Glafcos Clerides (who is currently the so-called 'president' of
the illegal regime in South Cyprus) was given the position of Chief of
Operations, his code name was Hiperides.
Makarios and his team drew up
the document, which was signed ''The Chief, Akritas'' and distributed it amongst
the ranks of EOKA as a top secret circular several months prior to December 1963
when the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces launched an all out attack on the
Turkish Cypriot population.
The Akritas Plan - Top
Recent public statements by
Archbishop Makarios have shown the course which our national problem will take
in near future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles cannot be
concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite chronological limits for
the conclusion of the various stages of development in national causes. Our
national problem must be viewed in the light of developments which take place
and conditions that arise from time to time, and measures to be taken, as well
as their implementation and timing, must be in keeping with the internal and
external political conditions.
The whole process is difficult and must go
through various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion
are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know, however, that
every step taken constitutes the result of a study and that at the same time it
forms the basis of future measures. Also, it is sufficient to know that every
measure now contemplated is a first step and only constitutes a stage towards
the final and unalterable national objective which is the full and unconditional
application of the right of self-determination. As the final objective remains
unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards
attaining that objective. This must, of necessity, be divided into internal and
external (international) tactics because the methods of the presentation and
handling of our cause within and outside the country are different.
A. Method to be used Outside
In the closing stages of the (EOKA)
struggle, the Cyprus problem had been presented to the world public opinion and
to diplomatic circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right
of self-determination. But the question of Turkish minority had been introduced
in circumstances that are known, inter-communal clashes had taken place and it
had been tried to make it accepted that it was impossible for the two
communities to live together under a united administration. Finally the problem
was solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich
Agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and
agreements between the contending parties.
(a) Consequently our first aim
has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus
problem has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed.
(b) The creation of the
following impressions has been accepted as the primary objective:
(i) that the solution which has
been found is not satisfactory and just
(ii) that the agreement which
has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties.
(iii) that the demand for the
revision for the agreements is not because of any desire on the part of the
Greeks to dishonour their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival of
(iv) that the co-existence of
the two communities is possible, and
(v) that the Greek majority,
and not the Turks, constitute the strong elements on which foreigners must rely.
(c) Although it was most
difficult to attain the above objectives, satisfactory results have been
achieved. Many diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that
the Agreements are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a
result of pressures and intimidations without real negotiations, and that they
were imposed after many threats. It has been an important trump in our hands
that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of
the people; acting wisely in this respect, our leadership avoided holding a
referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements
in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. Generally speaking, it has been shown
that so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and
that the Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.
(d) Having completed the first
stage of our activities and objectives we must materialise the second stage on
an international level. Our objective in this second stage is to show:
(i) that the aim of the Greeks
is not to oppress the Turks but only to remove unreasonable and unjust
provisions of the administrative mechanism;
(ii) that it is necessary to
remove these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late;
(iv) that this question of
revision is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not therefore give the right
of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise;
(v) that the proposed
amendments are reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the
(e) Generally speaking, it is
obvious that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression,
and especially against oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able
to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will
amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of
success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on
ENOSIS but on self- determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right
of self-determination fully and without hindrance, we must first get rid of the
Agreements (e.g. the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance etc) and of
those provisions in the Constitution which will inhibit the free and unbridled
expression of the will of people and which they carry dangers of external
intervention. For this reason, our first target has been the Treaty of
Guarantee, which is the first Agreement to be cited as not being recognised by
the Greek Cypriots. When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral
force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite.
It will be understood from the above explanations that it is necessary to follow
a chain of efforts and developments in order to ensure the success of our Plan.
If these efforts and developments failed to materialise, our future actions
would be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we would be
exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences.
Actions to be taken are as
(a) The amendment of the
negative elements of the Agreements and the consequent de facto nullification of
the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the
necessity of amending the negative aspects of any Agreement is generally
acceptable internationally and is considered reasonable (passage omitted)
whereas an external intervention to prevent the amendment of such negative
provisions is held unjustified and inapplicable.
(b) Once this is achieved the
Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and
(c) Once those provisions of
the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right
of self-determination are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to
express and apply its will.
(d) It will be possible for the
Force of the State (the Police Force) and in addition, friendly military Forces,
to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because we
will then be completely independent. It will be seen that it is necessary for
actions from (a) to (d) to be carried out in the order indicated. It is
consequently evident that if we ever hope to have any chance of success in the
international field, we cannot and should not reveal or proclaim any stage of
the struggle before the previous stage is completed. For instance, it is
accepted that the above four stages constitute the necessary course to be taken,
then it is obvious that it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment (a)
if stage (d) is revealed, because it would then be ridiculous for us to seek the
amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these amendments are
necessary for the functioning of the State and of the Agreements. The above are
the points regarding our targets and aims, and the procedure to be followed in
the international field.
The Internal Aspect
Our activities in the internal
field will be regulated according to their repercussions and to interpretations
to be given to them in the world and according to the effect of our actions on
our national cause.
1. The only danger that can be
described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful intervention. This
danger, which could be met partly or wholly by our forces is important because
of the political damage that it could do rather than the material losses that it
could entail. If intervention took place before stage (c), then such
intervention would be legally tenable at least, if not entirely justifiable.
This would be very much against us both internationally and at the United
Nations. The history of many similar incidents in recent times shows us that in
no case of intervention, even if legally excusable, has the attacker been
removed by either the United Nations or the other powers without significant
concessions to the detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the
attack on Suez Canal by Israel, which was condemned by almost all members of the
United Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the Israelis were
removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep the port of Eliat in the
Red Sea. There are, however, more serious dangers in the case of Cyprus. If we
do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under stage (a) above, we
will see, on the one hand, that intervention will not be justified and, on the
other hand, we will have every support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee,
intervention cannot take place before negotiations take place between the
Guarantor Powers, that is, Britain, Greece, and Turkey. It is at this stage,
i.e. at the stage of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need
international support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed
by us seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be extremely careful
in selecting the amendments that we shall propose. The first step, therefore,
would be to get rid of intervention by proposing amendments in the first stage.
Tactic to be followed: (Omitted)
2. It is evident that for
intervention to be justified there must be a more serious reason and a more
immediate danger than simple Constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be: (a)
The declaration of ENOSIS before actions (a) to (c) (b) Serious inter-communal
unrest which may be shown as a massacre of Turks. The first reason is removed as
a result of the Plan drawn up for the first stage and consequently what remains,
is the danger of inter-communal strife. We do not intend to engage, without
provocation, in massacre or attack against the Turks. Therefore, (section
omitted) the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife, or
falsely stage massacres, clashes or bomb explosions in order to create the
impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention is
imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our actions for amending
the Constitution will not be secret; we would always appear to be ready for
peaceful talks and our actions would not take any provocative and violent form.
Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal
fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to a plan. Our actions will have
a legal form.
4. It is, however, naive to
believe that it is impossible for us to proceed to substantial actions for
amending the Constitution, as a first step towards our more general Plan as
described above, without expecting the Turks to create or stage incidents and
clashes. For this reason, the existence and the strengthening of our
Organisation is imperative because:
(a) if, in case of spontaneous
resistance by the Turks, our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of
having a panic created among the Greeks, in towns particular. We will then be in
danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while if we show
our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then they will probably be
brought to their senses and restrict their activities to insignificant, isolated
(b) In case of a planned or
unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not it is necessary to
suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to
become masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would
not be possible, probable or justifiable.
(c) The forceful and decisive
suppressing of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions
for further Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply
these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will learn
that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences
for their Community.
(d) In case of the clashes
becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions (a)
to (d), including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS, because, then, there will
be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.
5. In all these stages we must
not overlook the factor of enlightening, and of facing the propaganda of those
who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the
reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through at
least four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and intentions
prematurely. It is therefore more than a national duty for everyone to observe
full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is vitally essential for our success and
survival. This, however, does not prevent the reactionaries and irresponsible
demagogues from indulging in false patriotic manifestations and provocations.
Our Plan would provide them with the possibility of putting forward accusations
to the effect that the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the
amendment of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out
Constitutional amendments in stages and in accordance with the prevailing
conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All this must no however, be
allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagogy, street politics and a race of
nationalism. Our deeds will be our undeniable justification. In any case owing
to the fact that, for well-known reasons, the above Plan must have been carried
out and borne fruit long before the next elections, we must distinguish
ourselves with self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have.
Parallel with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the present unity
and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this only by properly
enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten the public. Before
anything else we must expose the true identity of the reactionaries. These are
petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists. Their recent history shows
this. They are unsuccessful, negative and anti-progressive elements who attack
our leadership like mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive
and practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our activities
we need a strong and stable government, up to the last minute. They are known as
clamorous slogan-creators who are good for nothing but speech-making. When it
comes to taking definite actions or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be
unwilling weaklings. A typical example of this is that even at the present stage
they have no better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have
recourse to the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they should be
isolated and kept at a distance. We must enlighten our members about our plans
and objectives ONLY VERBALLY.
Meetings must be held at the
sub-headquarters of the Organisation to enlighten leaders and members so that
they are properly equipped to enlighten others. NO WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF ANY
SORT IS ALLOWED.
LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT
PERTAINING TO THE ABOVE IS EQUIVALENT TO HIGH TREASON. There can be no action
that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the
contents of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.
Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our activities, and our
publications in the press in particular, must be most restrained and must not
divulge any of the above. Only responsible persons will be allowed to make
public speeches and statements and will refer to this Plan only generally under
their personal responsibility and under the personal responsibility of the Chief
of sub-headquarters concerned. Also, any reference to the written Plan should be
done only after the formal approval of the Chief of the sub-headquarters who
will control the speech or statement. But in any case such speech or statement
MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION.
The tactic to be followed:
Great effort must be made to enlighten our members and the public VERBALLY.
Every effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our
plans in writing, or any reference in the press or in any document is strictly
prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue to
enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit without ever
divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.
Note: The present document
should be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibilities of the Chief
of the sub-headquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff within
10 days of its being received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the
whole or any part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters may have
it in their possession only under the personal responsibility of the Chief of
sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take it out of the office
The Chief AKRITAS
- From: C.H.
Dodd, (1993), `Cyprus: A Historical Introduction', in C.H.
Dodd (ed.), "The Political, Social, and Economic
Development of Northern Cyprus", Eothen Press,
Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, England.